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THAT SICK CHICKEN WON'T HUNT:
THE LIMITS OF A JUDICIALLY ENFORCED
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
George I. Lovell*
INTRODUCTION
Since the resolution of the New Deal constitutional crisis,
the non-delegation doctrine has lived a "fugitive existence at the
edge of constitutional jurisprudence. "1 Advocates of the doctrine argue that legislative delegation of rule-making power to
the executive branch is unconstitutional, and that the federal
courts should strike down legislation that delegates. Over the
last few decades, many constitutional scholars and critics of the
administrative state have expressed at least passing approval for
the doctrine, with an occasional thorough exploration and defense-most notably in David Schoenbrod's 1993 book, Power
Without Responsibility.2 Numerous scholars across the political
and ideological spectrum seem to accept the critique of the administrative process offered by proponents of the non-delegation
doctrine.3 Nevertheless, the doctrine's existence remains "fugitive," both in the law and in the academy. The Supreme Court
* Assistant Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. A version of
this paper was presented at the Law and Society Association I999 annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois. I wish to thank Joel Grossman, Susan Olson, and David Schoenbrod for
helpful comments on earlier drafts. A College of William and Mary Faculty Summer
Research Grant supported this project.
I. Peter L. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. I,l7 (1982).
2. David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People Through Delegation (Yale U. Press,I993). Other notable and thorough critiques
of delegation are Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. I (cited in note
I); Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,
(Norton, 2nd ed. I979). Lowi continues to attack delegation, but his belief that judges
can solve the problem has waned. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom:
Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 295 (I987).
3. The dust jacket for Schoenbrod's book (cited in note 2) features approving
quotes from a remarkable combination of people: Bill Bradley, Robert Bork, John Hart
Ely, Morris Fiorina, and Nadine Strossen.
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has shown little sustained inclination toward reviving the doctrine, and many of the scholars who express some support for it
don't seem to take it very seriously.
This paper takes the non-delegation doctrine seriously, but
argues that even strict judicial enforcement of a ban on legislative delegation will not necessarily result in dramatic improvements in policies or political accountability in the American
4
separation of powers system. Earlier critics of the doctrine
make important and compelling points, but their focus on constitutional and practical problems leads many of them to buy into
the same misleading assumptions about the connections between
delegation and accountability that defenders of the doctrine embrace. This paper instead challenges the non-delegation doctrine by challenging the understanding of political accountability
relied upon by proponents of the doctrine. I argue that proponents of the doctrine incorrectly give primacy to legislative decision-making when they think about accountability in our constitutional system, and thus incorrectly conclude that accountability
can be established or improved by judicial enforcement of a doctrine that forces legislators to make more decisions. The structure of the Constitution means that even a strictly enforced nondelegation doctrine will not by itself create a system in which accountable legislators have supreme and exclusive law-making
authority.
To show that judicial enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine cannot solve the problems of accountability identified by
the doctrine's proponents, I will provisionally accept some of the
key claims made by defenders of the doctrine. I will assume for
the sake of argument that the courts have the constitutional
authority to enforce a non-delegation doctrine and the practical
capability to prevent legislators from delegating lawmaking
power to the executive branch. Accepting these assumptions
4. Unlike other critics of the non-delegation doctrine, I will not focus on the arguments that advocates use to locate the doctrine in the Constitution's text and history,
see, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710 (1994)
(reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993)); Book Note, Delegation Without Accountability 108 Harvard L. Rev. 751 (1995) (reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993)). Nor will I argue that it is impossible for
judges to solve the practical problem of inventing a feasible and coherent test of unconstitutional delegation. Sec, e.g., Krent, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 734-52; Richard B. Stewart,
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Political
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev.
391 (1987). I also will not mount a freestanding defense of the desirability of insulated
bureaucratic decision-making processes. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985).
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allows me to focus on a question that has not yet received
enough attention: Would a judicially created "world without
delegation" be a world of greater democratic accountability than
today's world?
I find that the surface attractiveness of the non-delegation
doctrine masks some rather large gaps in its proponents' account
of the way that representation and democratic accountability
work in the American separation of powers system. Proponents
of the non-delegation doctrine urge the courts to bring an end to
delegation as a means of restoring or improving democratic accountability. And proponents of the doctrine usually do a very
good job demonstrating that there are problems with accountability in the current world of rampant delegation. But they
have failed to demonstrate a link between accountability and
delegation that is strong enough to prove that ending delegation
will solve the problems of accountability that they identify. In
response, I argue that proponents of the non-delegation doctrine
have underestimated the complexity of problems of accountability and thus overestimated the importance of delegation to
problems of accountability. Critics of delegation and proponents
of the non-delegation doctrine have mistaken one symptom of
some underlying problems with accountability in our constitutional system for the cause of those problems.
The observation that delegation is a symptom rather than a
cause emerges after a more careful consideration of how legislators and voters could respond to strict judicial enforcement of a
non-delegation doctrine. Proponents of the doctrine often admit
to considerable uncertainty about the precise results of strict judicial enforcement of the non-delegation doctrine. 5 But they are
apparently so unimpressed with the advantages of delegation,
and so appalled by the harms they associate with delegation, that
they are willing to take a plunge into the unknown. I agree that
the precise consequences of a judicial ban on delegation are difficult to predict, but I am less convinced that judicial intervention alone will dramatically improve the capacity of the people
to hold legislators accountable or to force legislators to produce
better policies. While critics suggest that delegation is an aberration in the constitutional system because it allows legislators to
escape accountability, I argue that the Constitution has always
allowed, and will continue to allow, legislators to use a wide variety of strategies to avoid accountability. Strict judicial en5.

See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 196 (cited in note 2).
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forcement of the non-delegation doctrine may prompt legislators
to shift to one of these alternative strategies for escaping accountability. But the non-delegation doctrine cannot create a
system in which Congress alone makes the laws or a system in
which majoritarian processes in Congress are sufficient to guarantee that outcomes have democratic legitimacy.
Thus, while it is possible to imagine some worlds without
delegation in which there is greater accountability, it does not
seem likely that the courts alone can create such a world. Improved accountability can be achieved within the Constitution's
flexible framework only if judicial resolve is accompanied by
numerous other, equally revolutionary, changes in the electorate
and in the structure of the intermediary organizations (e.g., parties, interest groups, mass-media organizations) through which
people participate in politics. Because court enforcement of the
non-delegation doctrine cannot force those changes, there is little hope that judicial enforcement of the doctrine will solve the
problems of accountability identified by proponents of the nondelegation doctrine.
Part one of the paper explains some of the connections between the non-delegation doctrine and the dominant theoretical
framework for understanding accountability in the constitutional
system of separation of powers. I use these connections to establish the importance of the debate over delegation in constitutional theory, and to suggest some reasons for the puzzling status
of the doctrine among constitutional scholars. Part two explores
and rejects three potential explanations of why the doctrine will
improve accountability. Part three examines some of the limits
on the power of judges to ensure the integrity of legislative
choices in a post-delegation world by focusing on one very likely
alternative legislative strategy for avoiding accountability: the
use of deliberate legislative ambiguity to shift decisions to the
courts. I conclude by noting the need for a more satisfying explanation of accountability in the American constitutional system, and make some suggestions toward developing an alternative account that better matches both the theory and the lived
experience of the United States Constitution.
I. DELEGATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE
COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN FRAMEWORK
Critics of delegation claim that legislative delegation to executive branch agencies is bad because it produces bad policies
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and weakens the accountability provided by electoral controls on
legislators. Legislative delegation to the executive branch allegedly creates these problems by shifting responsibility for making
important policy choices from elected officials in Congress to
unelected bureaucrats in executive branch agencies. When decisions are properly made in Congress, electoral controls on individual members make those members reluctant to support policies that benefit narrow interests. However, if Congress
delegates the power to make decisions to agency bureaucrats,
the lack of electoral controls on those bureaucrats allows concentrated interests to exert a corrupt influence on agency decision-making processes. Shifting such decisions to the executive
branch also allows legislators to escape accountability because it
allows them to blame the executive branch agencies for any unpopular decisions. Based on this understanding of delegation,
the critics conclude that ending delegation will improve accountability. By intervening and striking down all statutes that delegate, judges would force legislators to take responsibility for the
"hard choices" involved in regulatory policy-making. Forcing
legislators to make those choices will make it less likely that the
government will produce policies that favor narrow interests at
the expense of a broader public. 6
David Schoenbrod adds to the surface plausibility of this
analysis by using concrete examples of delegated regulatory decisions gone awry. Schoenbrod devotes a great deal of attention
to a favorite example, the regulation of navel oranges in the
1980s.7 Such regulation came in the form of marketing orders,
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under powers originally
delegated by Congress in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933.8 Schoenbrod convincingly argues that the marketing orders issued during the 1980s established bad policies that served
narrow interests and harmed the general public. Congress empowered an Agriculture Department advisory board to make
decisions on marketing orders. One industry actor, Sunkist, was
able to dominate the decision-making processes on that board.
Sunkist convinced the board to fix an artificially high price for
oranges, a policy that advanced Sunkist's interests at the expense
of both smaller growers and the general public. 9

6.
7.
8.
9.

On this last point, see id. at 16-18,99-106, 119-34.
Id at 47-57, 108, 114, 116, 140-42, 169-70.
Id at 4.
Id at 50-51.
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Schoenbrod blames this outcome on the ability of Congress
to delegate. Delegation shifted the decisions to an obscure wing
of the executive branch, making it likely that the public would
pay little attention (and perhaps not even notice that the price
supports existed). Because delegation allowed the executive
branch to issue the marketing orders without members of Congress taking a direct vote to create them, members of Congress
expected to be able to blame the Department of Agriculture if
anyone noticed the harmful orders and complained. At the
same time, delegation allowed members of Congress to win support from the concentrated interests that expected to benefit
from the shift in authority. 10
The critique of delegation made by Schoenbrod and other
advocates of the non-delegation doctrine is based on a particular
understanding of how accountability is supposed to work. The
critics assume that legislative decision-making occupies a sort of
privileged position when establishing or measuring accountability. In this respect, the critique of delegation is connected to the
dominant theoretical framework that constitutional scholars use
to understand democratic accountability in the separation of
powers system. I call that framework the counter-majoritarian
framework because its current dominance can be traced back to
Alexander Bickel's claim, in The Least Dangerous Branch, that
the power of judicial review created a "counter-majoritarian
problem" in American democracy. Bickel claimed that judicial
review was a "deviant" institution in American democracy because the power allowed unelected judges to make decisions that
reversed the choices made by elected legislatures. 11 Although
Bickel was primarily concerned with explaining judicial review,
the basic assumptions of his framework have wider application.
The counter-majoritarian framework's understanding of accountability in the separation of powers system begins with the
observation that the Constitution establishes different branches
of government, sketches the different duties of each branch, and
outlines separate methods for selecting the decision-makers in
10. ld at 54-57.
II. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Coun at the
Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962). See also Stephen P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 712 n.66
(1995), for a list of prominent scholars who note the continued centrality of the Bickel's
framework. Bickel's framework has lately been blamed for some important ills that beset constitutional theory, see, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the
Constitution, 98 Colurn. L. Rev. 531 (1998) but the book remains far more nuanced and
sophisticated than its current critics seem to remember.
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each branch. The distinctively counter-majoritarian moves are
to make the differences in the methods for selecting decisionmakers central to understanding accountability in each independent branch, and to make legislative outcomes the baseline
against which the democratic or majoritarian legitimacy of interbranch outcomes are measured. The counter-majoritarian theorists associate differences in methods of selecting decisionmakers with different levels of accountability, and then use those
differences among the branches to place each branch into a hierarchy of the branches. In that hierarchy, Congress occupies the
most exalted position because (since the adoption of the 17th
Amendment) each of the principal decision-makers in that
branch must face regular popular election. The courts, however,
finish a distant third to the two "elective" branches of government because of the weak and indirect electoral controls on judicial decisions. Judicial influence over policy is thus properly exercised only in the unusual set of circumstances that warrant
exercise of the power of judicial review.
The pervasive practice of legislative delegation in today's
polity disrupts this counter-majoritarian framework because
delegation challenges some of the assumptions that underlie the
framework's obsession with legislative outcomes as the baseline
for legitimacy and accountability. The counter-majoritarian
framework assumes, for example, that the branches act independently and compete with each other for influence over policy. The framework also assumes that the branches act in a fixed
sequence, in which Congress first establishes a policy that serves
as the baseline against which to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions later made in other branches. 12
When Congress delegates, however, Congress deliberately
refrains from choosing a particular policy outcome, and instead
empowers the relevant executive branch department or agency
to make those choices. This means that scholars cannot assess
the final policy outcome at the end of the implementation process by comparing it to some baseline position established in
Congress when the legislation passed. As critics of delegation

12. The executive branch presumably finishes somewhere between Congress and
the courts in the counter-majoritarian hierarchy of the branches. The president has a
unique status as the only nationally elected official, and in theory has control over many
of the decisions made in the hierarchically structured executive branch. However, few
observers are satisfied that such hierarchical control is effective enough to produce electoral accountability.
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often point out, delegation amounts to a refusal to establish such
a baseline.
Delegation also undermines the claim that unelected judges
can ensure the legitimacy of their interpretation of statutes by
deferring to the intent of a more accountable Congress. In a
world with delegation, judicial deference to legislative intentions
merely shifts decisions from unaccountable judges to perhaps
equally unaccountable bureaucrats in the executive branch.
Some of the scholars who work within the countermajoritarian framework do take the time to notice the existence
of the modern executive branch. Such scholars have tried to respond to the glaring fact that so many of the actual legislative
outputs that Congress produces fail to make the kinds of policy
choices that their theoretical framework envisions. Many such
scholars respond by declaring that delegation is itself a deviant
practice or historical aberration that is foreign to the overall constitutional scheme. 13 This move leads those scholars to suggest
that delegation is something that judges should, at a minimum,
discourage.
However, what is curious about the embrace of the critique
of delegation by these scholars is that, with the admirable exception of David Schoenbrod, the embrace seems half-hearted.
John Hart Ely provides a good example. Ely explicitly defends
the non-delegation doctrine in Democracy and Distrust but his
defense comes across as less than completely sincere. 14 After a
lengthy, nuanced account of the way judicial power can be used
to supplement and reinforce representation in legislatures and
thus improve accountability, Ely devotes just four pages to an
alleged rise in delegation. Ely expresses both support for the
non-delegation doctrine and doubts about the likelihood of the
Court's adopting and enforcing it. Ely's almost passing reference to the non-delegation doctrine strikes this reader as odd.
The doctrine, by Richard Pierce's estimate, calls for striking
down perhaps ninety-nine percent of our current regulatory
statutes. 15 If the Court did follow Ely's suggestion, the consequences would be far more dramatic than the cumulative consequences of all the doctrines to which Ely gives a more thorough

13. Sec, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
131·34 (Harvard U. Press, 1980); Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 158-62 (cited in note
11).
14. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 131-34 (cited in note 13)
15. Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power at 401 (cited in note 4).
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treatment in the other 180 pages of his book. It seems especially
odd to conclude a book devoted to developing a framework for
judicial restraint by saying, in effect, "Oh, by the way, most of
the existing U.S. Code is unconstitutional and deserves to be
struck down but we needn't worry about that because it isn't
likely to happen."
Many other scholars have been content to take a path similar to the one charted by Ely: Treat delegation as a harmful historical aberration, announce some form of lukewarm support for
some doctrine that limits delegation, but stop short of embracing
the dramatic consequences that a judicial ban on delegation
would cause, usually after noting that judges lack the chutzpah
to try it. Ironically, this is true not just of scholars like Ely, for
whom the non-delegation doctrine is a subsidiary concern, but
also of scholars who have developed some of the most compelling critiques of the practice of delegation and the strongest defenses of the non-delegation doctrine. Scholars have not devoted much attention to explaining what accountability and
16
policy-making will look like in a post-delegation world.
I submit that the difficulty that delegation poses for the
counter-majoritarian framework helps to explain the scholarly
16. Lowi, End of Liberalism (cited in note 2), and Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 7-21 (cited in note 1) review judicial decisions and defend the
doctrine, but they doubt that the courts will revive the doctrine and don't fully explain
how revival would create accountability. The exception to the pattern is David Schoenbrod, the doctrine's most accomplished defender. To his credit, Schocnbrod readily admits that the doctrine he advocates requires judges to take on a startlingly activist role,
and even scripts a twelve year plan that judges can use to ease the transition to a world
without delegation. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 180-91 (cited in note
2).
Scholarly ambivalence has been mirrored and supported by the courts. The Supreme Court has never rejected the ban on legislative delegation articulated in Schechter
Poultry, but other than an infrequent mention in a dissenting or concurring opinion, the
courts have not moved very far toward the dramatic strategy that Schoenbrod advocates.
Judicial decisions on the doctrine are reviewed in Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility, at 25-46, (cited in note 2); Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at
7-18 (cited in note 1); and Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public
Choice to Improve Public Law 132-36 (Yale U. Press, 1997). Judicial ambivalence reinforces the scholarly ambivalence because it allows scholars to fall back on the "realistic"
position that the courts will not embrace the doctrine any time soon.
A 1999 decision by the D.C. Circuit (American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United Stares
EnvtL Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 1027) rejected an EPA construction of a statute after
claiming that the construction effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. While the case attracted attention, the court did not take the bold approach advocated by leading proponents of the non-delegation doctrine. Instead of focusing its
wrath on Congress for writing a bad statute, the court criticized the EPA. Demonstrating
a lack of chutzpah, the court remanded the controversy to the agency (to come up with a
new rule) rather than to Congress (to come up with a statute that did not delegate).
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ambivalence that gives the non-delegation doctrine its "fugitive
existence." Faced with the threat that pervasive delegation
poses to their theoretical framework, constitutional scholars
have the choice of either 1) abandoning the framework, or 2) declaring delegation to be an aberrational and/or intolerable practice within the existing framework. Too many have chosen the
latter course. 17 The fact that so many scholars have made that
choice is one reason why, at the end of a century when executive
branch actors have taken over more and more lawmaking functions, scholarly work on accountability under the Constitution is
still dominated by a framework that cannot make much sense of
the means through which most of our regulatory law is madeexecutive branch policy-making.
The remainder of this paper argues that the uneasy ambivalence about delegation should not be resolved by treating
delegation as an aberrational practice or quietly urging the
Court to end it. Nor, for that matter, should it be resolved by
continually coming up with new arguments that defend executive
branch lawmaking from within the existing theoretical framework.18 A better way of resolving the ambivalence about delegation is to reject the dominant framework for understanding
democratic accountability in a constitutional system of separation of powers. That dominant framework simply cannot be
reconciled with the lawmaking practices that our Constitution
has created, not just since the New Deal but from the very beginning. I turn first to the task of examining further the threat
that delegation poses to the Constitution's system of accountability.

17. Recently, there have been some attempts to document the imponancc of executive branch discretionary decision-making and incorporate it into models for understanding the legitimacy and impact of judicial decisions. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the
Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 427 (1997); Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 (1997). However, such
scholars are still outnumbered by those who have declined to modify the dominant
framework.
18. For example, scholars like Stewan and Mashaw have suggested that delegated
decisions can be connected to democratic processes through effective procedural constraints on administrative processes. See Richard B. Stewan, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1975); Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance (cited in note 16).
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II. DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Schoenbrod's example of navel orange regulation is compelling because the process he describes seems so indefensible.
The marketing orders helped to fatten one already dominant
group without producing any offsetting public benefit. However,
it is still possible to question whether such examples mount an
effective attack on delegation. Given that almost all regulatory
statutes delegate, the fact that critics of delegation can tell horror stories about regulations issued by agencies does not prove
that delegation causes all the problems that the critics identify.
19
They may be confusing correlation with causation. To support
the non-delegation doctrine, the critics need a strong causal argument that links their horror stories to delegation, and a more
complete explanation of how judicial enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine will improve accountability.
In this section, I consider and reject three complementary
explanations of how ending delegation will improve accountability. I derive these explanations from the complaints that defenders of the non-delegation doctrine make about delegation.
The first explanation is that ending delegation will force members of Congress to take more decisive stands on regulatory issues. The second explanation is that ending delegation will improve accountability by locating decisions in the branch of
government to which people are more likely to pay attention.
The third explanation is that ending delegation will improve
democratic accountability by restoring some important constitutional limits on congressional power. None of these explanations
turns out to be entirely convincing. In each case, critics of delegation fail to appreciate that even if the courts deprive Congress
of the power to delegate rule-making authority to executive
branch agencies, Congress would retain numerous substitute
19. For example, it seems to me that one can construct an argument that our current system of campaign finance caused the problems in the navel orange case-an argument just as strong as Schoenbrod's argument that delegation caused those problems.
Schoenbrod himself provides support for this alternative causal account when he explains
how the dominant navel orange interests used campaign contributions to ensure congressional compliance in the navel orange program. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 8 (cited in note 2). It may also be that preventing contributions like those from
corrupting the legislative process would do more to prevent such rent-seeking policies
than a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine. It also seems to me quite clear that
t~e problems of our current system of campaign finance arc not unrelated to the propcnsuy of many members of Congress to support rent-seeking regulatory policies, and their
subsequent need to hide the sources and consequences of those policies through delegation. Happily, however, the issue of campaign finance and the associated constitutional
complications are well beyond the scope of this paper.
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strategies that circumvent democratic controls just as capably as
current forms of legislative delegation.
Explanation 1: Forcing Congress to go on Record Regarding
Unpopular Programs
Critics often complain that delegation allows members of
Congress to establish new regulatory policies without going on
record with a "yes" or "no" vote on particular regulatory rules.
For example, Schoenbrod complains that members of Congress
could selectively avoid responsibility for the navel orange marketing orders because members never had to indicate unambiguously their approval or disapproval of the orders issued by the
executive branch.20
An initial problem with this complaint is that it is not entirely accurate. Even in a world with delegation, voters can usually trace regulatory decisions to "yes" or "no" votes cast by
their representatives in Congress. It is true that members of
Congress do not cast "yes" or "no" votes on particular rules created by agencies, but they do quite often need to go on record
with "yes" or "no" votes that make agency activities possible.
Legislators must cast votes to establish executive branch agencies and to give those agencies the authority to make regulatory
decisions. The democratic controls created by such votes
weaken over time. (Most of the voters who voted for the legislators who passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act are now dead).
But members of Congress need to take at least one vote per year
(on the relevant appropriations bill) in order for any regulatory
program to continue, and circumstances sometimes force members to cast additional votes on particular programs.
Since no regulatory program can operate without being created and continually authorized by Congress, there is nothing
about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from
holding members of Congress accountable for regulatory power
exercised by the agencies. Opponents of incumbents are certainly free to make such votes an issue in the next campaign, and
they sometimes do. Representative George Nethercutt (RWashington) recently found this out the hard way from an ad
sponsored by some of his political opponents. Nethercutt
probably did not know that he had voted for the Endangered

20. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 54-55, 102, 103-05 (cited in note
2).
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Species Act twelve times until he saw an ad that recounted his
21
votes on various appropriations and authorizations items.
Schoenbrod's own example of delegation gone awry in navel orange regulation confirms that regulatory programs can
continue only because members of Congress take recorded votes
to support them. Schoenbrod notes that the marketing orders he
attacks were only possible because Congress passed a special appropriations rider that exempted the orders from the antiregulatory review programs of Reagan's OMB. In the House,
opponents of the marketing orders forced a floor vote on the
rider that determined whether' the program could continue. The
marketing orders won that recorded vote, 319 to 97. 22 That outcome does not bode well for those who think ending delegation
will automatically right the ship of state. Sunkist was apparently
able to buy elected members of Congress just as easily as Sunkist
was able to capture executive branch regulators. 23
Schoenbrod and other critics might respond to these observations by claiming that the problem is not that delegation
makes it impossible for the people to hold legislators accountable, but that delegation makes it exceedingly difficult to do so.
Schoenbrod claims that delegation is harmful because it allows
legislators to hide their choices in technical votes that fail to
frame issues clearly: "appropriations riders do not attract the
same level of public attention as legislation to raise the price or
cut the supply of a widely used commodity." 24 Schoenbrod
seems to be suggesting that the people would have paid more attention if Congress had been forced to address the marketing
orders more directly, e.g., by voting on the orders themselves
rather than on some obscure exemption from a regulatory review procedure.
Schoenbrod's suggestion that the people would have paid
more attention to a direct congressional endorsement of the
price fixing program has some merit. Unfortunately, the suggestion is of limited relevance to the debate over the non-delegation
doctrine. The suggestion would be relevant if we imagined that
a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine would force Congress to take a recorded vote on the "Inflate the Price of Orange

21. Jake Tapper, Endangered Congressman?, Salon Magazine (May 5, 1999)
<http://www .salon.cornlnewslfeature/1999/05/05nimits/index.html>.
22. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 52 (cited in note 2).
23. Id. at 8.
24. ld at 55.
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Juice in Order to Line the Pockets of the Fat Cat Orange Growers Act of 2000." The problem, however, is that the nondelegation doctrine, even in the strong form proposed by
Schoenbrod, cannot force Congress to address regulatory problems in such a stark form. Since the Constitution explicitly gives
Congress control over its internal decision-making procedures,
members would retain considerable power to structure votes to
serve their own interests and to hide controversial votes. The
non-delegation doctrine cannot prevent Congress from burying
divisive regulatory decisions in the technical details of omnibus
regulatory bills, or in bills with misleading names and provisions.
For example, Congress could presumably bundle all the rules in
the current Code of Federal Regulations into a single bill.
Members of Congress who voted for such a bill could escape responsibility for any unpopular programs included in it by pointing to other, more popular, items in the compromise package.
Thus, the desirability of forcing Congress to vote on regulatory rules does not provide much support for the claim that the
non-delegation doctrine will solve the problems of accountability
that delegation seems to create. Members of Congress already
have to cast such votes in order for agencies to exercise delegated power. The new doctrine would force members of Congress to cast votes on particular rules, but members would retain
the ability to shield those votes from public attention and the
power to take responsibility for regulatory programs only selectively. Accountability might be improved by forcing Congress to
vote separately on each regulatory program, but neither the nondelegation doctrine nor anything else in the Constitution forces
Congress to do so.
Explanation 2: Relocating Regulatory Decisions
It is, however, possible to improve on the first explanation
by supplementing it. Critics of delegation suggest that something about the nature of decision-making processes in bureaucratic agencies adds to problems of accountability. Critics conclude that accountability breaks down in cases involving
delegation because the public lacks the capacity to pay sufficient
attention to regulatory decisions in the agencies. The nondelegation doctrine may improve accountability by simply ensuring that the decisions are made in Congress, the location
where the public is most able to pay attention.
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Critics of delegation sometimes suggest an explanation of
this type when they characterize agency decision-making processes. Critics claim that delegation erodes accountability because it makes policy-making processes complicated, obscure, or
just plain boring. Schoenbrod claims that public opinion is often
dampened by "prolonged administrative procedures" making
public opinion "less powerful" in an administrative setting than
"in an open legislative battle. "25 Delegation allows Congress to
defeat the democratic controls by leaving Congress free to add
enough layers of decision-making authority to make sure that
the process always exhausts the public's limited capacity to pay
attention. Faced with such complexity, the people will not
bother to identify and punish the legislators responsible for the
bad policies.
Critics of delegation often use claims of this sort to add a
strong normative component to their arguments. Schoenbrod,
for example, contrasts the "unsophisticated interests" most often
the victims of delegation with the "sophisticated interests" that
pressure Congress to delegate. "Sophisticated interests" like
Sunkist benefit from delegation because they possess the resources to monitor and influence agency decision-making processes. Meanwhile the "unsophisticated" interests, a much larger
group, pay the dispersed costs of rent-seeking regulations that
they are often too duped to notice. 26
The problem, however, is that critics of delegation wield a
double-edged sword when they complain about the mass public's
limited capacity to pay attention to regulatory decisions. By
emphasizing how difficult it is for the public to pay sufficient attention to the details of government processes, and arguing that
it is easy for "sophisticated" interests to dupe the masses, critics
of delegation make it more difficult to believe that judges can
create significant improvements in accountability by enforcing a
strict non-delegation doctrine. It is hard to see how ending delegation• will make
the masses more sophisticated or lengthen their
27
attention span.
25. Id. at 77.
26. On the link between concentrated benefits, dispersed costs, and delegation, see
Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in
Roger G. Noll, ed., Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 175-97 (U. of California
Press, 1985); Michael T. Hayes, The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative Typology, 40 Journal of Politics 134 (1978).
27. Mashaw argues against the non-delegation doctrine by suggesting in part that
delegation does not result in a loss of relevant information for most voters because most
voters rely on rough assessments of candidate ideology to make decisions about how to
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More importantly, if the courts were to end delegation, the
capacity of the public to monitor decisions in Congress would be
severely tested. Congress would presumably be forced to make
more decisions-and more complicated decisions-about the details of regulatory policies. Presumably, much of the boredom
that the public now associates with the administrative processes
would simply be transferred to Congress, along with the responsibility for making many of the boring decisions that used to be
made in the agencies.
The critics of delegation could respond to these concerns by
arguing that in today's world of rampant delegation, it is the location, and not the technical content, of the decisions that creates the boredom. Perhaps there is some inherent feature of bureaucratic decision making that mutes public (or perhaps media)
attention to agency decisions. Arguments of this sort have been
made about judicial decision-making. Girardeau Spann, for example, worries about the power of judges to "legitimate" unpopular outcomes, and suggests that people quietly accept policy
outcomes established by judges, even when the same people
would actively resist the same policy outcomes had they been established by elected legislators. 28 Unfortunately, however, it is
quite difficult to extend Spann's arguments about the mystical
legitimating powers of judges to the considerably less mystical
powers of bureaucrats. It seems quite unlikely that people on
the receiving end of a bad regulation would fail to complain simply because they fell under some hypnotic spell of bureaucratic
infallibility. Indeed, critics of delegation sometimes emphasize
that one problem with bureaucratic decision making is that the

vote, not on information about how legislators voted on particular details of particular
policies. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance at 139-40 (cited in note 16). Schocnbrod recently responded by saying that a judicial ban on delegation will improve accountability even if voters do not pay attention to the details of legislation. This is because ending delegation will mean that legislators will no longer be able to avoid floor
fights on contentious issues. Schoenbrod claims that "the fulcrum of legislative responsibility is not the statute but the floor fight," Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A
Reply to My Critics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731, 744 (1999), in part because "[f)loor fights
are newsworthy and attract public interest," id at 745. However, there is no guarantee
that choices will be fought out on the floor just because they are written into legislation.
Furthermore, if the framers of the Constitution were convinced that the floor fight was
the "fulcrum of responsibility," it is odd that they did not include provisions in the Constitution ensuring that those fights would be carried out in the open. Congress can close
the door on a floor fight when it wants. It is public vigilance, not judicial enforcement of
a constitutional doctrine, that keeps most debates open.
28. Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities
in Contemporary America, 150-60 (N.Y.U. Press, 1993).
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public accords bureaucratic decisions less legitimacy than deci29
sions made in Congress.
Of course, there is no reason to take the current capacity of
the public to pay attention to the details of regulatory processes
as a permanent fact about the world. The current low level of
public attention to agency decisions may be a product of the
rampant use of delegation. The public might be calculating that
it is not worth monitoring government decisions when the officials most responsible for harmful decisions are likely to be insulated from electoral controls. Those calculations might change
in a world without delegation because people will instinctively
assume that responsibility for decisions rests with elected officials in Congress. Seen in this light, the claim that ending delegation will improve the public's capacity to pay attention to
regulatory decisions is more plausible.
While these considerations provide a coherent story of one
source of improved accountability in a world without delegation,
they do not prove that judicial enforcement of a non-delegation
doctrine will, on balance, improve accountability or improve the
position of "unsophisticated" interests. The added congressional
workload and added need for congressional attention to detail
that the non-delegation doctrine would create could still exhaust
the public's newly stimulated appetite for monitoring Congress.
And because Congress would retain numerous avenues for complicating and obscuring its choices, there might still be opportunities for members of Congress to do favors for their most sophisticated friends and to hide their most cynical compromises.
Explanation 3: Restoring Constitutional Limits on Legislation
A third explanation of how the non-delegation doctrine improves accountability is that ending delegation will restore some
important constitutional limitations on Congress's power. According to some critics of delegation, the framers of the Constitution wanted to ensure that Congress would not pass legislation
unless, after careful deliberation, a strong consensus formed in
favor of a new law. To inhibit excessive legislation and protect
liberty, the framers established numerous procedural constraints
that slow down the legislative process, prevent Congress from
reaching bad compromises without careful deliberation, and of29. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 122 (cited in note 2) (arguing that "statutory laws are more likely to be taken as community standards of right
and wrong than are agency laws").
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fer opportunities to block or delay legislation. The procedural
obstacles that the critics of delegation point to are bicameralism,
presentment, and, most importantly, the alleged ban on delegation.30
Critics suggest that delegation subverts these important
constitutional limits on Congress's power. Delegation makes it
easier for members of Congress to pass laws in the absence of a
strong consensus, and thus more likely that Congress will pass
laws without careful deliberation and restraint. While finding
consensus will be harder in a world without delegation-in
which members of Congress are forced to take responsibility for
their decisions-the delays will be desirable since they will allow
opportunities for more careful deliberation. In some cases, a
ban on delegation may lead Congress to abandon attempts at
regulation, an outcome that critics of delegation are often happy
to embrace. 31
Once again, however, it is not certain that the only consequences of enforcing a non-delegation doctrine are going to be
the ones applauded by the doctrine's proponents. The claim that
a non-delegation doctrine will force Congress to deliberate more
carefully and inhibit excessive legislation is only believable if
members of Congress cannot find alternative means of reaching
compromises in the absence of delegation. As things now stand,
delegation is not the only means used by members of Congress
to find compromises that break stalemates or to avoid responsibility. If the courts made it impossible for Congress to delegate,
Congress would be likely to substitute one or more of those
other means.
For example, legislators deprived of their power to delegate
might instead try to reach compromises by increasing pork barrel spending or by logrolling regulatory programs into huge omnibus bills. Such practices are already notorious in those policy
areas in which Congress now passes detailed legislation (e.g.,
taxes and appropriations). Recognizing that the consequences
of pork barreling might be even worse than the consequences of
delegation, critics of delegation deny that these alternative
methods of reaching compromise are a significant concern.
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, for example, reject the suggestion that Congress would increase pork barrel spending,
30. For an extended discussion of these issues, see id. at 107-18.
31. See, e.g., id. at 135-36, 139-42. Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. at 63-65 (cited in note 1), make similar claims.
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claiming: "This argument assumes that the legislature is not already maximizing its return from pork-barrel (private-goods)
production. We assume the contrary, however, and conclude
that an increase in the cost of delefation will reduce the total
output of inappropriate legislation.''3
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson's contrary assumption is
itself implausible, as can be seen by using a market metaphor.
Enforcing a non-delegation doctrine would presumably change
legislators' calculations about the costs of pork barreling. Raising the cost of delegation (or removing delegation from that
market altogether) will presumably make legislators eager to
purchase more of a substitute good, in this case, pork-barrel legislation. Thus, the level at which a legislature maximizes its return from pork-barrel production in a world of rampant delegation may be much lower than the level at which returns will be
maximized in a world with a judicially enforced non-delegation
doctrine. Presumably, Congress would also adjust to the world
without delegation by making its internal structure more conducive to alternative means of reaching compromises.33
Even beyond the problems posed by alternative means of
forming compromises, there are compelling reasons to think that
the critics have offered a flawed analysis of Congress's incentives
with regard to constitutional limitations inhibiting excessive legislation. The critics' arguments suggest that delegation is a sign
of a legislation-mad Congress trying to subvert structural controls that inhibit legislative compromises. This assumption
seems quite odd when tested against the internal procedural
rules that Congress has created for itself. Many of those rules
32.

Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 64 n.246 (cited in note

1).

33. Stewan discusses the possibility of Congress responding to a ban on delegation
by relying on more internal delegation to committees. Stewan, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. at 33132 (cited in note 4). Schoenbrod himself mentions Justice Breyer's suggestion that Congress simply adopt agency rules as statutes, an outcome that would presumably defeat
much of the gain in accountability from judicial enforcement of the non-delegation doctrine, unless Congress chose to vote separately on each rule, a very unlikely outcome.
Schocnbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. at 765 (cited in note 27). The anicle by Stephen Breyer,
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo. L.J. 785 (1984), also provides a reminder of a
past lesson about the capacity of legislators to get around coun rulings that seem on the
surface to deny Congress the ability to be flexible in designing administrative processes.
The Supreme Coun's famous ruling "ending" the legislative veto in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), like the non-delegation doctrine,
attempted to limit Congress's power by reassening constitutional limits on Congress's
P?~er .. But while Chadha attracted a. great deal of attention, the decision-making flexibility gJVen to Congress by the Constitution left Congress with numerous means of getting around the force of the coun's opinion. See Breyer, supra.
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make it much harder for legislation to pass, not easier. Members
of Congress have created the filibuster in the Senate, rules limiting amending activity in the House, and the decentralization
institutionalized through the committee system and weak institutional sources of party cohesion.34 These rules and practices often inhibit the passage of legislation by increasing the veto points
for opponents, and often make it more difficult to form cornpromises. A Congress bent on finding easy compromises and
subverting the Constitution's structures for inhibiting legislation
would presumably have adopted a different way of proceeding.
A more fundamental shortcoming in the third explanation
appears when one looks beyond the federal legislature to state
and local governments. One possible and perhaps likely consequence of a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine is that
many regulatory functions currently performed by the federal
government would be taken over by the states. Once again, this
is a consequence that some critics of delegation are quite happy
to ernbrace. 35
Presumably, critics of delegation are comfortable returning
regulatory powers to the states because they are confident that
state governments will exercise power more responsibly than the
federal government. Surprisingly, however, the critics don't fully
explain why they are so confident. Schoenbrod, for example,
provides some examples of states successfully creating responsible regulatory programs, but is also forced to concede that James
Madison believed that the state governments were more susceptible to capture by factions. 36 Without making a further positive
argument, Schoenbrod concludes his discussion of state governments by stating that states should be given the power to take
over federal regulatory functions "unless we have a good reason
to distrust state government more than we distrust national gov37
ernment. "
Schoenbrod and other critics of delegation may be covertly
buying into the arguments of modern day states' rights advo34. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Congressional Quarterly Press, 4th ed. 1996), contains a readable overview of congressional procedures and their effect on decision making. None of the rules and institutional practices
just listed arc required by the Constitution. Congress created them and could also abandon them.
35. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 136-39 (cited in note 2).
36. Id. at 137. Schocnbrod responds to Madison by claiming that such concerns are
less relevant in the modem world where "most states surpass the entire original thirteen
in population and diversity." Id.
37. ld.

2000]

LIMITS OF NON-DELEGATION

99

cates, who repeat as mantra the claim that state governments are
"closer" to the people than is the federal government in Washington, and thus are less likely to pass excessive regulations that
interfere with liberty. But that claim is certainly open to challenge in a modern world of mass communication, where people
participate at much higher rates in federal than in state or local
elections. Furthermore, while some state capitals are today hotbeds of anti-regulatory sentiment, there is no historical pattern
linking level of government with opposition to regulation or protection of liberty. William Novak's recent comprehensive account of law and regulation in the nineteenth century destroys
the myth that state and local governments did not regulate the
economy or interfere with liberty in the nineteenth century. Novak exhaustively documents efforts by state and local governments to regulate "nearly every aspect of early American economy and society, from Sunday observance to the carting of
offal."38
It is, of course, unlikely that state governments would respond to judicial enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine by
exercising the same regulatory powers that they exercised in the
nineteenth century. The more important and more general lesson that emerges from accounts like Novak's is that state governments retain broad and undefined police powers under our
Constitution, powers that the states would be free to exercise
should federal power go into remission.
These expansive and largely undefined police powers of the
states should be especially disturbing to someone like Schoenbrod, who insists that the people are not smart enough to use
electoral controls on government officials to protect liberty, and
that judges need to step in to supplement those electoral controls
by enforcing constitutional limits on the power of those elected
officials.39 Schoenbrod's lack of faith in electoral controls can be
seen in his insistence that the Supreme Court intervene to enforce the non-delegation doctrine. Schoenbrod argues that such
judicial interference is necessary because the people are not
clever or attentive enough to use the ballot to protect liberty or
38. William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in NineteenthCentury America I (U. of North Carolina Press, 1996). For additional perspective on
regulation by state courts (often without the nuisance of statutory law) in the nineteenth
century, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harvard U. Press, 1977); Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States (Cambridge U. Press, 1991).
39. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 170-73 (cited in note 2).
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40

end excessive regulation. Ironically, however, state legislators
are not subject to many of the constitutional limits that Schoenbrod sees as essential for producing accountability in the federal
41
system. State laws don't even need to be made by legislatures! 42
Given that Schoenbrod concedes that state governments are
likely to assume expanded regulatory functions in the aftermath
of a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine, the absence of
many of those constitutional controls on the powers of state governments seems to provide the "good reason to distrust state
government more than we distrust national government" that
Schoenbrod was searching for.
Ironically, one limit on federal power that does not seem to
apply to the states is the non-delegation doctrine itself. While
Schoenbrod and other critics of delegation can imaginatively derive a constitutional prohibition on delegation by placing a particular gloss on a particular piece of constitutional text (the first
sentence in Article 1),43 there is almost nothing in the Constitution that suggests that a similar prohibition applies to state governments.44 As state governments assume important regulatory
functions now performed by the federal government, it is unlikely that the private interests that are now so successful at
pressuring Congress will simply wither away. Their more likely
response will be to expand operations in the state capitals. Once
there, there is nothing that prevents them from recreating at the
state level the incentives to shift many important regulatory decisions to state regulatory agencies. And there is nothing in the
case law of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries that could support a Supreme Court effort to stop the state governments
should they decide to delegate more.
Of course, there is no way to know for certain the extent to
which Congress and the states would make these adjustments in
response to judicial intervention. But in the face of Schoen40. ld.
41. Of coun;c, some critics of regulation complain that many of the limits on federal
power have been eliminated in practice during this century as the courts have adopted
expansive definitions of Congress's enumerated powers, especially the commerce power.
But parallel limits on state powers do not even exist in theory.
42. Marci A. Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93
Mich. L. Rev. 1539 (1995) (reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility
(1993)) discusses the importance of making state ballot initiatives a part of the discussion
on the non-delegation doctrine.
43. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 155-57 (cited in note 2).
44. Ely suggests that the courts locate a ban on state delegation in the guarantee
clause. Democracy and Distrust at 240-41 n.78 (cited in note 13). I think Ely's resort to
the guarantee clause speaks for itself.
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brod's admitted uncertainty about what the world will look like
without delegation, the possibility of state government delegation, coupled with the much broader police powers retained by
the states, creates a counterweight to the optimistic presumption
that curbing federal delegation will result in less regulation
and/or more liberty. While the non-delegation doctrine may reinvigorate some constitutional limits on federal legislative powers, gains made at the federal level could be more than offset as
regulatory responsibilities shift to a level of government that is
less subject to the constitutional restraints that Schoenbrod
thinks are essential to protecting liberty.
III. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE COURTS
In addition to considering the changed role state and local
governments might play in the aftermath of the non-delegation
doctrine, it is important to consider the changed role of the
courts. In particular, it is important to consider whether judges
will end up assuming responsibility for making a large number of
the "hard choices" that Congress now delegates to the agencies.
The practice of legislators deferring important decisions to
the courts in order to avoid responsibility for difficult policy
45
choices is not without historic precedent. Before delegation to
executive branch agencies became such a common practice, legislative default and judicial regulation was more the norm than
the exception in many areas of policy making. In the nineteenth
century, judge-made common law constituted a significant part
of legal regulation of both the economy and private conduct.
Many aspects of daily life were regulated by judges without
authorization or involvement of legislators. Some scholars have
mistaken the shortage of legislative regulation in the nineteenth
century for a laissez faire economic system. But over the past
few decades, James Willard Hurst, Morton Horwitz and the generation of legal historians that they inspired have tried to correct
that mistake by tracing the important constitutive power of law
and judicial regulation in the nineteenth century.46
The relative significance of the common law in the nineteenth century "state of courts and parties"47 is worth consider45. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Non Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislation Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (1993).
46. For a discussion of these issues and review of the literature, see Novak, The
People's Welfare at 19-50 (cited in note 38).
47. See Stephen Skowroneck, Building a New American State: The Expansion of
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ing because the conduct of legislators during that pre-delegation
era was in many respects similar to the conduct they engage in
today when they delegate: Nineteenth century legislators routinely deferred to judicial law-making as a means of avoiding accountability for divisive decisions. Understanding the role of
judges in the nineteenth century is crucial for making an accurate assessment of how accountability was damaged or improved
by the development of the modern administrative state. 48
Schoenbrod suggests that before the development of the
administrative state, our political system was one in which judges
were able to ensure accountability by preventing delegation and
thus forcing legislators to take principled stands divisive policy
issues. Schoenbrod bases his account of pre-New Deal governance and accountability on two things: 1) The observation that
the federal government did not create independent regulatory
agencies until the twentieth century; and 2) a very small number
of Supreme Court decisions articulating a rule against delegation.49 But because he thinks of regulation and delegation only
in their twentieth century forms, and then looks only at the case
reporters for the Supreme Court for evidence of how law and
governance worked before the New Deal, Schoenbrod ends up
with a tremendously distorted picture of law, governance, and
politics before the New Deal. That picture does not square at all
with the accounts offered by scholars who have looked in more
detail at how democratic processes actually worked before the
creation of the modern administrative state.
A powerful example is Stephen Skowronenck's very detailed account of the transformation from the party system of the
late nineteenth century to the modern administrative state.
Skowroneck makes it clear that before the creation of the administrative state, political competition was nothing like the system Schoenbrod imagines in the past and aspires for in the future. Accountability, such as it was, was not based on voters
National Administrative Capacities, 1877·1920 at 39-46, 47-162 (Cambridge U. Press,
1982).
48. Nothing I say in this section is meant to establish that accountability could not
be improved in the future if some decisions that are now delegated were instead made by
legislators. But a proper understanding of the past is important, not just to counter the
misleading historical claims made by proponents of the non-delegation doctrine, but also
for understanding the complexity of the problem of accountability and for understanding
why judges lack the power to create accountability through constitutional doctrines. I do
not mean to deny that it is possible to create an improved system of democratic governance where there is both more accountability and less delegation.
49. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 30-31, 33-36 (cited in note 2).
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responding after judges forced legislators to take principled
stands on divisive policy issues. Rather, political competition
was centered primarily on the distribution of patronage, and
judges rather than legislators took responsibility for settling a
broad range of important policy questions. 50
Legislators did occasionally step in and codify some areas of
law, usually after judicial rulings came under attack by reformers.51 Often, however, nineteenth century legislators could avoid
policy controversies by doing nothing at all, confident that the
courts would go on making decisions _!lbout regulation as they
announced evolving common law rules.' 2
Perhaps the most significant example of judicial regulation
in the face of legislative default is provided by regulation of labor relations. While nineteenth century legislators never delegated power to a powerful centralized regulatory agency like the
NLRB, that did not mean that legislators took responsibility for
labor regulation, nor did it mean that labor organizations went
unregulated. Christopher Tomlins/3 Karen Orren,54 David
Montgomery,55 Victoria Hattam,;c, and William Forbath57 have all
documented how judges controlled and shaped the labor movement through such common law prohibitions as conspiracy, vagrancy, and enticement, and later by enforcing yellow dog contracts and issuing injunctions. Because of this web of judicial
controls, legislators in the nineteenth century could be confident
that labor would not roam free even if legislators never took
clear stands on divisive issues of labor regulation. 58
50. Skowroneck, Building a New American State (cited in note 47).
51. Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of
Antebellum Legal Reform (Greenwood Press, 1981).
52. Of course, regulation by judges is not the same thing as regulation by agency
bureaucrats. The judiciary is probably more insulated from political pressures than the
agencies, a feature that gives legislative deference to judges both advantages and disadvantages over legislative delegation.
53. Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law and the
Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (Cambridge U. Press, 1985): Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge
U. Press, 1993).
54. Orren, Belated Feutkllism (cited in note 38).
55. David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United
States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century 52·114 (Cambridge U. Press, 1993).
56. Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business
Unionism in the United States (Princeton U. Press, 1993).
57. William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement
(Harvard U. Press, 1991).
58. Schoenbrod's response to concerns about the role of common law courts in the
nineteenth century is to claim that common law is more democratic than agency law be-
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Do any important lessons about the limits of a nondelegation doctrine emerge from these observations regarding
deference to judicial policymaking in the nineteenth century?
Past experience with common law regulation seems on the surface to be of limited relevance today. The "state of courts and
parties" of the nineteenth century was replaced by the modern
administrative state because judge-centered regulation lacked
the capacity to administer the regulatory tasks that needed to be
performed in the complex economy of the twentieth century. 59
After a century of codification of regulatory policies by legislatures and agencies, it seems very unlikely that judge-made law
could substitute for very much of the agency law that would be
dismantled by a non-delegation doctrine. More importantly, if I
am assuming that judges are enforcing a non-delegation doctrine, I should also be willing to assume that those judges have a
strong commitment to forcing legislators to act responsibly.
There is no reason to think such judges would conspire with legislators in further efforts to regulate without legislation.
Nevertheless, I think proponents of the non-delegation doctrine still need to be quite concerned about the possibility that
ending delegation will lead legislators to rely on judges to resolve conflicts over policy choices. The common law is not the
only means through which legislative deference to the courts can
result in a shift of policy-making responsibility from legislators
to judges. In a future world without delegation, the more relevant strategy of legislative deference to the courts would probably be deliberate ambiguity in legislative language. This legislative strategy for avoiding accountability is often overlooked
despite the fact that it has long been a most reliable and resilient
60
tool for legislators wishing to avoid accountability.
cause it is derived from custom. "To the considerable extent that common law grows out
of community custom, it reflects a popular consensus and so is no less democratic than
statutory law." Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 157 (cited in note 2).
There may be some contexts in which such a claim is plausible. But the claim of democratic custom appears almost ludicrous in the context of judicial regulation of the economy in the nineteenth century as documented in the above-cited sources on labor history
and by accounts such as Novak's. Schoenbrod also suggests in private correspondence
that the policy-making role of the courts in the nineteenth century is "inflated in retrospect." Much recent historical work on the role of the courts during that period supports
precisely the opposite conclusion-that the important regulatory role of the courts has
been badly underestimated. Letter to author, dated 8/19199 (on file with author).
59. Skowroneck, Building a New American State (cited in note 47).
60. In an earlier unpublished paper, I noted that many scholars of statutory interpretation notice the importance of deliberate legislative ambiguity, but also argue that
few of them bother to incorporate the problems created by deliberate ambiguity into
their models and explanations. George I. Lovell, Deference, Denial, and Labor Legis/a-
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Two studies that I conducted of labor reform legislation
demonstrate the importance of the strategy of legislative ambiguity.61 My studies re-examined nineteenth and early twentieth
century conflicts between legislatures and the courts by looking
at the evolution of several failed reform statutes. The statutes I
looked at gave rise to notorious instances of alleged judicial interference with legislative reforms. I was able to show in several
cases that the failure of the statutes to attain their advertised
goals was not the result of judicial usurpation of legislative
power, as earlier scholars had claimed. The failure was instead
the result of legislators deliberately using ambiguity in statutory
language to shift responsibility for difficult decisions to judges.
This political strategy seemed to work even as the reforms failed:
Judges typically received most of the blame after they (quite
predictably) resolved the ambiguity in the statutes with interpretations that hurt the interests of labor organizations.
I first found examples of such deliberate legislative ambiguity in nineteenth century state statutes aimed at judges who were
using the common law of criminal conspiracy to control labor
organizations.62 A subsequent longer study found that ambiguity
remained an important legislative strategy in a series of federal
statutes from 1898-1935, a period that covers the crucial transition from the nineteenth century common law system to the New
Deal administrative system. 63
Of course, examples of past use of legislative ambiguity are
only relevant here if it is likely that legislators will respond to
strict enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine by using ambiguity to shift decisions to judges. My initial but incomplete answer is to point out that legislators have never stopped using the
strategy of deliberate ambiguity. Even as Congress has increasingly relied on delegation, judges continue to make important
policy decisions as they interpret statutes and oversee decisions
made in the agencies. Legislators are well aware of the important role of judges as interpreters of statutes when they draft
tion: Rethinking Judicial Policymaking, Legislative Decision Making, and Democratic
Accountability, Paper presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting,
Aspen, Colorado, June 4-7, 1999 (on file with author).
61. George I. Lovell, The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New York
State in the Late Nineteenth Century, 8 Studies in American Political Development, 81
(1994); George I. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals and Judicial Policy Making in American
Labor Law, Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science, University of Michigan (1997) (on file
with author).
62. Lovell, Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms (cited in note 61).
63. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals (cited in note 61).
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legislation, and have not always been able to resist the temptation to use open-ended language to shift important policy decisions to judges.
The continuity between pre- and post-New Deal use of deliberate ambiguity can be seen by considering the Wagner Act.
The Wagner Act was a quintessential New Deal statute that established a permanent regulatory agency (the NLRB) and delegated important policy-making functions to that agency. My
earlier study found evidence that even as Congress was perfecting the growing practice of delegation to executive branch agencies, Congress was also establishing important oversight responsibilities for judges and artfully using ambiguity in legislative
language to make sure that judges would have the final say over
at least some particular policy controversies.64
The possibility of legislators using ambiguity in legislative
language as a tool for shifting accountability to judges is not unlimited. In some policy contexts, (e.g., criminal law or laws that
have a plausible chilling effect on free speech) judges may be inclined to strike down ambiguous laws on grounds of overbreadth
or vagueness. 65 But despite doctrines that discourage vagueness
and ambiguity, judges spend a tremendous amount of time and
energy resolving interpretive controversies about the meaning of
statutes. Often, the courts are called on to make choices that
Congress could have easily made when the statute was passed,
and members of Congress continue to keep legislative language
open-ended as a way of building consensus. One need look no
further than recent interpretive decisions on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and sexual harassment to realize that Congress
has not given up on the practice. 66
Defenders of the non-delegation doctrine might still object
that judges inclined to end delegation will also take steps to end
deference to the courts through legislative ambiguity, perhaps by
more vigorously striking down laws that are open-ended or am64. ld. at 203-32.
65. The requirement related to vagueness and overbreadth are themselves limited.
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
66. Journalists' accounts of deliberate ambiguity and subsequent judicial decisions
appeared in both the New York Times and the Washington Post on the same day in 1998.
See Fred Barbash, Congress Didn't So the Coun Did, Washington Post C1 (July 5, 1998);
Linda Greenhouse, Sure Judges Legislate. They have co, New York Times 4:1 (July 5.
1998). These articles discuss, among other things, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 104 Stat. 3Z7, 42 U.S.C. 12102, et seq (1994). The Supreme Court resolved one
of many ongoing interpretive controversies about the meaning of the ADA in Surton v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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biguous.67 However, the task of limiting ambiguity in statutory
language is very different from the task of limiting delegation of
rule-making authority to the agencies. Even if judges can, in
theory at least, hold legislators to a "no delegation" standard,
they cannot possibly hold legislators to a "no ambiguity" standard. To expect legislators to resolve in advance all the interpretive controversies that might arise as judges decide concrete
cases is simply unreasonable. Scholars of statutory interpretation have recognized since at least the time of Aristotle that unexpected situations and changes in background conditions make
accidental ambiguity and the resulting interpretive controversies
inevitable. 68
It is because defenders of delegation know that interpretive
controversies cannot be eliminated that they are very careful to
distinguish impermissible delegation to agencies from the inevitable and perfectly permissible interpretive role that judges will
play as they apply legal rules. Schoenbrod, for example, recognizes the problem of ambiguity and goes to considerable effort
to explain that judges retain responsibility for interpreting statutes in a world without delegation. 69 He also offers several suggestions for distinguishing law-making from law interpretation,
and distinguishes statutes that delegate from statutes that are not
specific.70 However, his suggested method for distinguishing
statutes that allow for judicial interpretation from statutes that
unconstitutionally delegate legislative power cannot distinguish
interpretation that arises from accidental ambiguity from interpretation that results from deliberate ambiguity. Schoenbrod
does not even attempt to make that distinction. This omission is
crucial because judges will have a very difficult time improving

67. Some celebrated cases over the past few decades have been taken as a signal
that judges have become less tolerant of this legislative strategy and more willing to try to
force Congress to legislate clearly by shrinking their own role as interpreters of statutes.
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Some critics of delegation have applauded these decisions as a sign of judges'
interest in giving members of Congress incentives to pass clearer laws. Nevertheless,
judges continue to make policy decisions of considerable consequence as they resolve
ambiguities in statutes. For an empirical account of the complicated effects of Chevron
on administrative decision making, see Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative LAw, 1990 Duke L.J. 984,
1020-43, 1058-59.
68. R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights 8 (Brookings
Institution, 1994).
69. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 189 (cited in note 2).
70. Id at 181-85.
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accountability through a non-delegation doctrine if they cannot
prevent Congress from delegating to the courts.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the conventions judges follow when interpreting statutes are almost
completely blind to the practice of deliberate deference to the
courts through ambiguous legislative language. The competing
methods judges use to discover, recover, or imaginatively reconstruct the "intent" of Congress or the meaning of statutory texts
invariably assume that ambiguity in statutes is the result of accidents.71 And the conventions that judges observe when they peruse legislative records in search of "intent" make it very unlikely that interpreters will uncover evidence of deliberate
ambiguity. 72
The problem is that the interpretive conventions that judges
follow when they attempt to resolve controversies about the interpretation of statutes are tremendously misleading in cases involving deliberate ambiguity. While committee reports and
speeches by floor managers can be reliable sources for finding
legislative intent when there is an intent to be found, they are
also the least likely place in the congressional record to find evidence of deliberate ambiguity. Committees and floor managers
typically have the greatest stake in holding together a coalition
that is built through ambiguity, and are thus much less likely to
call attention to ambiguity than backbenchers who want to disrupt that coalition. In my,study, I was able to uncover evidence
71. Lovell, Deference, Denial, and Labor Legislacion (cited in note 60).
72. For example, in my studies of labor legislation (cited in note 61), judges always
responded to interpretive controversies by making a conventional, and very limited, inquiry into the legislative text and history and then announcing their discovery of the "intent" of a unified Congress. After making a more extended inquiry into the legislative
history, I was able to show that Congress had, in reality, deliberately used ambiguous or
contradictory language to avoid establishing a single intent on the relevant policy choice
and to force the courts to resolve the inevitable interpretive controversies that the statutory language would create. The "intent" that the judges "discovered" was not the work
of Congress, but something that the judges themselves manufactured through the interpretive process.
Significantly, I was able to explain the judicial decisions that manufactured intent
without claiming that judges acted out of bad faith, conspiratorial motives, or a lack of
interest in legislative integrity and congressional accountability. Their discovery of legislative intent was the natural result of their reliance on conventional methods for reading legislative histories. Those methods could probably not be better designed to hide
evidence of deliberate legislative ambiguity. For example, in a notorious case interpreting the Oayton Act of 1914, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921},
the Supreme Court followed well-established interpretive conventions that tell judges to
ignore most legislative records. The judges in Duplex were willing to exam~ne a~d. cite
committee reports and floor speeches by the floor managers to support theu positiOns,
but they ignored everything else. Id at 474-75.
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of deliberate ambiguity only by rejecting interpretive conventions and developing a method of interpreting legislative decisions that looked at the full legislative record and the broader
73
political context in which legislation passed.
So long as judges retain the established conventions for
working with legislative histories, the possibility of legislators
successfully using ambiguity to force judges to decide contentious issues remains a real one. Judges might try to eliminate
this problem by abandoning the interpretive conventions and
looking at more legislative records, but doing so would buck the
current trend. Judges might even adopt some of the heretical
practices I used in my second study, including looking at all the
floor speeches and at rejected legislative proposals from earlier
congresses. However, that is not a course I could recommend.
In addition to being incredibly cumbersome and timeconsuming, the methods I used to uncover evidence of deliberate
ambiguity in statutes are not foolproof. I designed a conservative set of conditions for identifying cases of deliberate ambiguity that I hoped would minimize false positives (i.e., incorrectly
concluding that an accidental ambiguity was deliberate). However, it was impossible to specify those conditions so that they
did not allow false negatives (i.e., incorrectly concluding that deliberate ambiguity was accidental). The conditions I used were
good enough for my purpose, which was only to demonstrate
that deliberate ambiguity sometimes plays a significant role in interbranch conflicts. But it is not good enough if the goal is to
allow judges to identify and then strike down all statutes in
which Congress makes deliberate use of ambiguity to avoid responsibility for some policy controversy. Based on my experience with early twentieth century labor statutes, I don't think the
records legislators leave behind are sufficient to make those
judgments with sufficient confidence. Furthermore, as soon as
judges announced a new set of interpretive conventions that
called for looking at additional records, legislators would pre73. Justice Scalia argues that judges should avoid all of these complications by giving up on the idea of finding legislative intent, ignoring legislative history, and sticking to
the text of statutes to find their objective meanings. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter
of Interpretation: Federal Couns and the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997). However,
judges will presumably have a hard time finding the objective meaning in the text of statutes.that ar~ deliberately designed to be ambiguous and to generate interpretive controv~rs•~s for Judges to resolve. In ~ses of deliberate textual ambiguity, the strategy of
stlck.m~ to the ~ext ~as the oppos~t~ cffe~t to the one Scalia hopes for: The strategy
maxJmJzes the discretion of the mdiVIdual JUdge to choose the policy outcome that he or
she personally favors.
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sumably adjust their behavior by keeping evidence of deliberate
ambiguity out of those records.
Thus, there is no guarantee that judges will recognize their
own complicity in legislators' deliberate use of ambiguity, even
in a post-delegation world in which conscientious judges want to
restrict legislators' efforts to use ambiguity in statutes. If legislators did respond to a judicial prohibition on delegation by increasing their use of ambiguity, they might not be able to shift
responsibility for decisions to judges as reliably as they have
been able to shift responsibility for making substantive regulatory rules to the executive branch. But even if the method of deferral to the judiciary is less reliable, it still undermines the claim
that the delegation doctrine forces legislators to assume responsibility for regulatory choices.
Moreover, the possibility of inadvertent judicial complicity
in legislative efforts to avoid accountability threatens the legitimacy of judicial efforts to prevent delegation. If unelected
judges decide to strike down ninety-nine percent of the regulatory laws that the people's representatives have passed over the
last century in the name of forcing greater legislative accountability, those judges had better be pretty confident that doing so
does not simply create the appearance of a judicial coup. Since
one consequence of strict enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine is likely to be an increased judicial power to make substantive decisions on regulatory policies, it would be quite difficult to
avoid that appearance. Whether they like it or not, judges are
likely to help Congress to continue to avoid accountability in the
uncharted world without delegation.
IV. CONCLUSION. BRINGING THE PEOPLE BACK IN
The non-delegation doctrine is presented by many of its
proponents as a tool for restoring the original vision of the framers of the Constitution.74 One lesson that seems to emerge from
the above discussion is that judged by the standards for accountability offered by defenders of the non-delegation doctrine, the
Constitution's system of separation of powers is a miserable failure. If the framers of the Constitution thought that they had
provided for accountability and legitimacy by empowering
judges to force elected legislators to make all the laws and rules,
and if they thought they had done this by giving the courts the
74.

See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 155-58 (cited in note 2).
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power to enforce a rule that prevents delegation to the executive
branch, then the system that they established has thus far proven
incapable of advancing their vision. We have never had either
the majoritarian system envisioned by the counter-majoritarian
framework, or the purely legislative system that the proponents
of the non-delegation doctrine seek to restore. After more than
two centuries, the Constitution has yet to coincide with a system
in which popularly elected officials create and take responsibility
for the bulk of our laws and regulations.
The discussion above also makes it clear that the problem
did not start with, and is not the result of, judicial weakness of
will at the time of the New Deal. It has always been the case
that much of the law in place under the Constitution has been
created outside the legislative branch by unelected officials who
elude direct accountability by democratic controls. Things don't
look any better for the future. Even if future judges decide to
enforce new restrictions on the legislative power to delegate, the
remaining constitutional controls on legislative activities are
much too porous to guarantee that legislators will make the
"hard choices" or to ensure that they can be held directly accountable for the choices that they make.
The lesson that I wish to draw, however, is not that the
framers failed to attain their vision, but that scholars have failed
to identify correctly what that vision was. If the framers of the
Constitution intended to establish a set of rules, procedures, and
limitations that was sufficient, with appropriate judicial guidance, to ensure majoritarian accountability, they made some
very strange choices. In particular, the system they established
seems woefully incomplete. Majoritarian accountability cannot
be guaranteed merely by holding the elections required in the
Constitution and forcing those who win the elections to make
"hard choices."
Whether or not the people can produce accountability in a
democratic system depends on much more than giving people
access to the ballot and easy knowledge of which choices elected
legislators made on difficult policy issues. Knowledge of how
one's elected representative voted on a divisive policy issue does
not ensure that one can hold that representative accountable for
making the wrong choice. The level and type of accountability
achieved in any political system depends much more on a broad
range of interrelated institutional and cultural factors. These
factors include such things as basic constitutional structure (e.g.,
separation of powers/federal system vs. parliamentary systems)
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system of representation (e.g., single member districts vs. proportional representation), internal decision-making rules for
legislatures (e.g., agenda control, amending power, committee
structure, filibusters), rules regarding elections (e.g., secret ballots or party ballots, access to the ballot, rules regarding patronage and campaign finance, procedures for drawing electoral districts), the number of viable political parties, the level of public
attention to politics, voter turnout, the amount of information
available to the electorate, distribution of educational opportunities, and the structure and norms of the mass media (amount of
competition, partisan press vs. "objective media"). 75 Significant
changes in any of these factors can produce significant changes
in who will be elected and in the kinds of policy choices those
elected representatives will make. Such structural changes can
lead to changes in outcomes even when the goals and preferences of the electorate remain unchanged.
When it comes to these structural factors that affect accountability, two things are striking about the choices made by
the framers as they created the Constitution. The first is that
they declined to make specific choices to influence a large number of the institutional and cultural factors just listed. The explanation for the failure of the framers to make all the relevant
choices is not that the framers lacked the wisdom or foresight to
understand that such choices were important. The framers instead trusted the people or their representatives to make most of
those choices, and were content to establish a loose framework
that has accommodated many different choices about important
factors. The result is that the U.S. has experienced numerous
successive democratic systems within the same constitutional
framework, not a single correct system that has been disrupted
by historical aberration or fits of judicial infidelity.
The second is that when the framers did make specific
choices, the choices that they made are quite often difficult to
square with the assumption that the framers equated legitimacy
with majoritarianism (tempered by a few individual rights), and
difficult to square with the assumption that they equated accountability with rule by legislators. Judged by those assumptions, many of the crucial decisions made by the framers are in75. On the importance of structural factors in the system of representation, see,
e.g .• Douglas W. Rae, The Polirical Consequences of Electoral Laws (Yale U. Press, re~.
ed. (1971 )). For a historical perspective on the importance of party structure and med1a
conventions, see Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Policies: The American
Nonh, 1865-1928 (Oxford U. Press, 1986).
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explicable: for example, the decision to establish two other coequal and independent branches of government, the decision to
leave the states largely to their own devices, the decision to establish a Senate that was not chosen by popular election, and the
decision to include a provision explicitly giving Congress the
power to structure almost all of its internal decision-making processes.
I think the more charitable interpretation of the choices that
the framers made is to assume that they wanted to balance their
commitment to democratic rule by majoritarian legislatures with
their very powerful misgivings about a purely legislative, purely
majoritarian system. In a system with one supreme and elective
branch of government, it would be quite easy for people to assign blame for "hard choices" and to exact retribution for bad
choices at the ballot box. But the framers decided not to create
such a system. They instead created a separation of powers system in which independent judicial and executive branches, not to
mention independent state governments, act as a counterweight
to legislative power. It was the original decision to establish the
independent sources of power outside the legislature, and not
judicial cowardice in the face of the New Deal, that makes it
possible for legislators to find strategies that shift responsibility
for difficult decisions. If the federal legislature did not have to
compete with state governments and two coequal branches at
the federal level, it would be much more difficult for legislators
to hide behind the actions of others, and thus much easier to
hold Congress accountable for unpopular outcomes. But it also
would be much harder to limit the power of that lone majoritarian branch. Full accountability comes only at the cost of
granting absolute power, and on that issue the framers made a
very clear choice.
The framers did not try to close off all the possible strategies available to members of Congress who wanted to avoid
taking responsibility for choices. But the framers also did not
prevent the people from collectively creating a better system
with more democracy and more accountability than the original
system allowed. Such changes as the 15th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 24th,
and 26th amendments are examples of constitutional changes
that demonstrate the continuing capacity of the people to create
improvements in accountability and the democratic system
within the existing framework.
Likewise, the framers did not prevent the people from creating a political system with no delegation (like the one favored
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by Schoenbrod), or from creating the "juridical democracy" envisioned by Lowi. The people could probably create such systems without changing the Constitution, and nothing I have said
here contradicts the suggestion that the people would be better
off if legislators delegated less power to the executive branch.
But improvements will be much greater if delegation ends because the people develop an interest in holding legislators accountable for unpopular decisions that are now made through
delegation. The people are likely to develop the capacity to insist on an end to delegation only if improvements in the way
people are organized make it easier to hold legislators accountable for the choices they make.
So far, however, the people and their representatives have
not constructed such a system. Efforts like Schoenbrod's and
Lowi's to document the pathologies of the current system are no
doubt a good way to convince the people to try something new.
But it is doubtful that the courts could successfully impose on
the people the type of system favored by Schoenbrod or Lowi
before the people are capable of taking the ongoing steps
needed to make such systems work. Ending delegation by judicial fiat will only improve accountability if the underlying organizational pathologies that give rise to delegation are cured as
well. The most that the courts can do is cure one symptom of
the underlying disease. The Constitution leaves it up to the people to develop the principles and capacities that will get us out of
the current mess.
Strong proponents of judicial intervention might object to
the suggestion that these choices were simply left to the people
acting through their elected representatives. Critics of delegation might try to borrow a strategy advocated in a very different
context by John Hart Ely. 76 Ely argues quite powerfully that the
constitutional system assigns to the courts at least some responsibility for ensuring that representation works effectively and for
making adjustments when representation breaks down. If critics
like Schoenbrod are right that the people have failed to prevent
their representatives from creating a distorted system with little
accountability, perhaps judges should reinforce representation
by forcing legislators to perform some particular version of their
constitutionally mandated role as lawmakers. Judicial intervention may be especially well justified given Schoenbrod's suggestion that the people cannot check delegation because their
76. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-104 (cited in note 13).
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elected representatives have effectively hidden the costs of the
current system from the unsophisticated masses.n
I think, however, that it is too soon to say that the people
have failed, too soon to give up on the people as a potential
source of solutions, and thus too soon to insist that the people
have abdicated and need the help of judges if they are to continue the ongoing task of creating a "more perfect union."
While the behavior of the people looks unsophisticated and indolent to the critics of delegation, that may only be because
those critics view accountability through the lens of legislative
supremacy and the counter-majoritarian framework. In reality,
the people may not be as foolish as the critics of delegation suggest, or as helpless in the face of legislative deception.
I found some evidence for these claims in my case studies of
labor legislation. My cases provided instances of labor organization attempting to use statutory changes to limit the ability of
judges to interfere with workers' collective activities. Most of
the statutes I looked at failed to achieve their advertised policy
goals, in part because judges established interpretations of the
statutes that were quite hostile to labor organizations. I showed,
however, that the power of judges to make such decisions was
the result of legislators' conscious choices to avoid settling divisive policy issues and to instead make legislative language more
ambiguous.
On the surface, the labor cases seem to fit an explanation
much like the one that critics of delegation give when attacking
"rent-seeking" regulations emanating from the agencies. The
explanation might be that better organized and more sophisticated employers won their battles with labor because the employers were able to dupe the unsophisticated workers into accepting bad legislative compromises. On this explanation, judges
concerned about reinforcing representation might have felt justified in refusing to enforce the ambiguous legislation. Doing so
would aid the helpless workers who lacked the sophistication
needed to tell the difference between insincere legislation and
political triumphs.
However, after looking more carefully at the legislative
compromises from the perspective of labor organizations, I
found that the surface explanation of labor's activities did not fit
the facts. I found that instead of being dupes, labor organiza77. Schoenbrod, Power WithoUJ Responsibility at 92·93, 229 n.42 (cited in note 2).
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tions had a very sophisticated understanding of the links between legislative language and the likely role to be played by the
courts, and that they knowingly entered into and endorsed legislative compromises that had little chance of delivering their
stated policy goals. After discovering that labor leaders were
not fools, I had to develop an alternative explanation for their
behavior. I found that their apparently uninformed and unsophisticated activities were in reality a very capable response to a
difficult array of organizational imperatives and political realities. By choosing to compromise at the appropriate moment, labor leaders were able to attain important organizational goals,
and their decisions ultimately put labor organizations in a better
position to win longer-term goals by improving labor's political
78
position for subsequent legislative bargaining. Ironically, labor
organizations might not have gained as much if they had been in
a fully majoritarian system where it was impossible to defer to
the courts. The problem for labor organizations was not that the
workers were fools, but that they did not have the power to win
clear majoritarian victories. A strict ban on delegation to both
the executive branch and the courts would not have solved that
problem, and would have deprived them of the ability to use
legislative bargaining and compromises to achieve longer-term
goals.
The important lesson that emerges from the labor example
is that scholars should be careful about imputing particular goals
to groups of people and then concluding that those groups are
unsophisticated, incompetent, and in need of judicial assistance
just because they don't achieve those goals. It is possible that
behavior that looks unsophisticated is actually a rational adaptation to a complicated political system in which power is widely
dispersed. To evaluate accountability in any political system, it
is crucial that researchers try to understand the barriers that the
system creates from the perspective of those interests actually
taking part in the political processes. They may discover important advantages to the existing system that are invisible on the
assumption that the goal of political activity is always clear cut
legislative victories that produce favored policy outcomes or allow voters punish the responsible legislators.
Similarly, the fact that the people continue to tolerate widespread legislative delegation may be a more sophisticated choice
than it appears to critics of delegation. While Schoenbrod has
78.

Lovell, Legislative Deferrals at 70-131, 192-202 (cited in note 61).
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recently taken on an admirable crusade against the forces of
elitism by taking the side of "outsiders" against the "insiders"
9
who want to subvert democracy by allowing delegation/ his unwillingness to trust the people to solve these problems without
the aid of judges does not demonstrate an unblinking faith in
democratic processes.
Furthermore, the choice to retain powerful institutional rivals to Congress is not one that has always been imposed upon
the unsuspecting masses from the duping powers above them.
There have been numerous times in American history when reformers have advocated magic bullet solutions designed to restore accountability by taking authority away from Congress's
rival branches. From the codification movements of the nineteenth century to FDR's court packing plan to Reagan era deregulation, these reforms have produced important adjustments
in the roles and responsibilities of the different branches within
the constitutional framework. One great advantage of the constitutional system established by the framers is that it has allowed those changes and adjustments to occur. It is especially
significant to note that these movements have always stopped
short of stripping Congress's rival branches of so much power
that they ceased to function as important alternative sources of
lawmaking authority. The codifiers of the nineteenth century
did not rid us of the common law, the Court survived and rose
again despite Roosevelt's plan, and the regulatory agencies
Reagan found when he arrived in Washington, with a few exceptions like the ICC, seem to chug along. The decisions to stop
short of destroying independent sources of rule-making power
may not be as irrational as they seem to critics of delegation. In
an increasingly diverse and divided society, organized groups
hoping to hold government accountable may prefer bargaining
processes that allow those groups to develop organizational
strengths while hunting for helpful legislative compromises.
Such a system may produce a more responsive and permeable
government than the aU-or-nothing majoritarian system of accountability favored by the advocates of the non-delegation doctrine.

79.

Schoenbrod, Delegarion and Democracy at 749,764 (cited in note 27).

